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The study of law and emotion is now established as a distinct field of study in its own 
ƌŝŐŚƚ ? /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ? ůĞŐĂů ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ŚĂƐ ƐŚĂƌĞĚ ŝŶ ĂǁŝĚĞƌ  ‘ĂĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƚƵƌŶ ? ƚŚĂƚ ŚĂƐ
involved twenty first century social science in a new concern to explain the 
contribution of emotional feelings to human thought, motivation and behaviour. This 
development has been accompanied by a pronounced debate over how emotion 
should be rendered accountable within a rational frame of analysis. On the one hand 
it is possible to portray this as being sustained by a movement to make us more 
emotionally literate and more sensitive to the ways people act and think through 
feeling. On the other hand, it might be interpreted as being rooted in a concern to 
make matters of emotion more amenable to rational discipline and the sanction of 
reason. In this article I contend that where a focus is brought to the experience of 
 ‘ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ? ?ƚŚĞǀŽůƵŵĞŝƐƌĂŝƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?/ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĂƌŐƵĞ
that opposing and contested points of view on the experience and value of 
 ‘ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƵƐǁŝƚŚǀĂůƵĂďůĞŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƐŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚ
ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ĂĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƚƵƌŶ ? ?dŚĞƐĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ
with reference to the social theories of Max Weber and Norbert Elias. Moreover, in 
ƚĂŬŝŶŐŶŽƚĞŽĨ,ĂŶŶĂŚƌĞŶĚƚ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽĨĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ?/ĂƚƚĞŶĚ
not so much to how the controversy of compassion might be resolved, but rather, to 
its potential to awaken critical humanitarian concern. Compassion is hereby 
ĐĞůĞďƌĂƚĞĚĂƐĂŶŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚůǇ ‘ƵŶƐƚĂďůĞĞŵŽƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚďƌŝŶŐƐĚĞďĂƚĞƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
bounds of human care and social justice. 
 
Keywords: Compassion, Law, Nussbaum 
 
I. Introduction 
Martha Nussbaum contends that compassion ŝƐ ‘ƚŚĞďĂƐŝĐƐŽĐŝĂůĞŵŽƚŝŽŶ ? ?EƵƐƐďĂƵŵ ?
1996a). Her interest lies in its potential to make possible sympathetic identifications 
with the suffering of others and for this to be cultivated as a virtue of civic, legal and 
judicial rationality. Nussbaum celebrates compassion as a power to inspire us in the 
effort to understand the contexts and experiences that do harm to people. She further 
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takes it as a moral guide to the life conditions and types of action that serve our human 
well-being. On her account, coŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶŝƐĂǀŝƚĂůĨŽƌĐĞŝŶƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ĂǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨ
ƐŽĐŝĂůũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ?EƵƐƐďĂƵŵ ? ? ? ? ?Ă ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ? 
,ĞƌĞ ? ƐŚĞ ďƌŝŶŐƐ ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ŽĨ ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ?
EƵƐƐďĂƵŵ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚůŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚŵŽƌĂůŝĚĞĂƐƚŚĂƚƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂŶĚŵŽĚĞƌĂƚĞ
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĂƚĞ ĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐ ? ĂŶĚ ŚŽǁ ŝŶ ƚƵƌŶ ? ƚŚĞƐĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ƚŽ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ
beneficent actions. She repudiates the suggestion that compassion is wholly impulsive 
and irrational, ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ?ŚĞƌĂŝŵŝƐƚŽŵĂŬĞĐůĞĂƌŝƚƐ ‘ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ? ?EƵƐƐďĂƵŵ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?&Žƌ
Nussbaum, compassion is a highly complex emotion that involves us in evaluations of 
the social meaning of human suffering, judgŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŵŽƌĂůĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌĂŶĚ
motives, and in debates over our relative capacities for human recognition, mutual 
identification and the extension of solidarity. 
At the same time, Nussbaum does not shy away from acknowledging the 
fallibility of compassion. Indeed, when reviewing opposing philosophical traditions of 
debate over its status as a moral virtue, she is particularly concerned to attend to its 
ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚ ‘ŝŶƐƚĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŽƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ ‘ƵŶƌĞůŝĂďůĞ ? ?^ŚĞƐĞĞŬƐƚŽŵĂŬĞĐůĞĂƌ
the extent to which, insofar as compassion is cognitively organised, it is also malleable 
and inconstant. Variations in the dynamics between its cognitive elements and in how 
these are narratively arranged for us are apt to produce contrasting expressions of 
compassion. Compassion is implicated in many different and even opposing types of 
action (Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 297-441). Indeed, no doubt she is all too aware of the 
fact that compassion is appropriated on behalf of both liberal and conservative 
political agendas, and that it is used as a pretext to promote the extension of leftist 
state welfare policies as well as neo-liberal ethics of self-reliance (Amable, 2011).  It 
does not lend its support to any particular vision of social justice, rather it does more 
to aggravate debate over which vision of social justice is preferable and over how this 
ought to be pursued in action. 
These are among the reasons why Nussbaum readily concedes that 
 ‘ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ŝƐ ĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂů ?  ?EƵƐƐďĂƵŵ ?  ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ ?  ? ? ? ) ? ^ŚĞ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐ ƚŽ ƚŚŝƐ ďǇ
ŽƵƚůŝŶŝŶŐĂŶĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐ ‘ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŵŽƌĞĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞ ?ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶŝŶ
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society.  This essentially concerns the cultivaƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ  ‘ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĂƚĞ
ŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ďǇŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŝŶƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ ?ůŝƐƚĞŶŝŶŐĂŶĚďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞƚŽƐƚŽƌŝĞƐ
about people motivated by compassion to engage in various types of humanitarian 
action. Here she particularly recommends the study of SoƉŚŽĐůĞƐ ? ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ůĞŐĞŶĚ ŽĨ WŚŝůŽĐƚĞƚĞƐ ĂŶĚ ^ƚĞŝŶďĞĐŬ ?Ɛ ƉŽƌƚƌĂŝƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ:ŽĂĚ ĨĂŵŝůǇ ŝŶ The Grapes of 
Wrath. For Nussbaum the controversy of compassion is animated in the plotlines of 
narrative scripts. It is brought into relief by stories that elucidate the human meaning 
ŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŽŵƉƚƵƐƚŽĚǁĞůůƵƉŽŶƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŽĨ
contrasting responses to their plight. It involves us in disputes over our preferred role 
models of compassion and in debates over how to interpret the moral meaning and 
consequences of the compassionate thoughts and actions attributed to characters in 
novels, plays and film. In this regard, she advises politicians and judges to practice at 
being exemplars of compassionate conduct on the stage of public life.  For the most 
ƉĂƌƚ ?EƵƐƐďĂƵŵ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƐŝŶ a literary vein.  Compassion is addressed as a 
matter for textual analysis. She portrays its controversies as being largely configured 
by differences of narrative context and setting.  
In what follows I contend that this fails to pay adequate heed to some 
important social and cultural dimensions of compassion and its attendant 
controversies as featured in sociological accounts of the emotional and humanitarian 
dispositions of people under present conditions of modernity. I review some of the 
ways in which the controversy of compassion is met in debates over the impacts of 
 ‘ŵĞĚŝĂƚŝƐĞĚ ?ŝŵĂŐĞƌǇŽĨƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐŽŶŽƵƌƚĞƌŵƐŽĨŵŽƌĂůĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐĂŶĚĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?/
also seek to relate some of the problems raised here to observations on the role 
played by intensifying forces of rationalisation in our moral attitudes towards the 
problem of suffering and further, their place in advancing modern processes of 
 ‘ĐŝǀŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?/ŶĂůůƚŚŝƐ/ĂŝŵƚŽŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽf sociological understanding that 
lend weight to the suggestion that we are living in a period where we are made 
particularly subject to social and cultural conditions that dispose us to become 
preoccupied with the moral meaning of human suffering and with the moral adequacy 
of our response to what we know about the suffering of others. This is used to 
underline some of the ways in which projects to make legal and judicial processes 
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more carefully attuned to the dynamics of compassion are also liable to raise the 
volume on the controversies it generates. While I am prepared to agree that 
compassion is the basic social emotion, I would also emphasise that it serves to expose 
the ways in which social life takes place as enactments of substantive values in which 
there are many clashes of human interest. In our experience of compassion and of our 
involvement in compassionate behaviours we are very likely to be immersed in some 
of the most pronounced antinomies of our social being and existence. 
The first section of this paper sets a stage for engaging with the controversy of 
ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶďǇƐƵƌǀĞǇŝŶŐŝƚƐůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚŽĨ ‘ůĂǁĂŶĚĞŵŽƚŝŽŶ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂƐ
far as legal scholarship is concerned, is most heavily involved  in debates over the  
significance of compassion. Its controversy is then explored in more detail and with 
the aim of contextualising current developments in law and emotion in a wider frame 
of critical and sociological analysis. This builds towards an invitation to further 
dialogue and debate over the propensity for the controversy of compassion to serve 
as an awakening to social life as consisting in the moral experience of pronounced 
value conflicts. 
 
II. On law and emotion 
The topic of compassion features as a prominent concern in the field of  ‘ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ
ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶ ?  ?Bandes and Blumenthal, 2012). This field is generally regarded as 
committed to advancing the study of emotion as an important component of 
investigations into contemporary legal and judicial practice. Here, researchers share 
in the understanding that their work is distinguished by an attempt to re-evaluate the 
principles on which the criticism and appraisal of law takes place. This is also held to 
ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŶĞǁĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽůĞŐĂůĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ ‘ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůůŝƚĞƌĂĐǇ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ?ĂƐĂƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚĨŽƌƚŚŽƐĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶůĞŐĂůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-making 
(James, 2013; Montgomery, 2008).  
It is important to recognise that this is more than a movement to inculcate a 
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more sophisticated approach to moral reasoning (Kahan and Nussbaum, 1996). It is 
also more than a series of attempts to expose the ways emotions function or how they 
might be more effectively regulated in legal settings (Maroney and Gross, 2014). While 
ƐŽŵĞ ĐŽŶĨŝŶĞ ƚŚĞ ƚŽƉŝĐ ŽĨ  ‘ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŽ ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ƚĞĐŚŶŽĐƌĂƚic 
considerations, others identify it as part of a vanguard development in terms of 
human understanding that holds revolutionary consequences for the ways we make 
sense of our thoughts and behaviours and their conjunctions in meaningful action. 
,ĞƌĞ  ‘ƚĂŬŝŶŐ ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶƐ ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ? ŵĞĂŶƐ ďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚůŽŶŐƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ
contend that, both in its teaching and practice, law should be governed by ideals of 
dispassion and purely procedural rationality (Abrams and Keren, 2009).  
In part this is driven by an attempt to revise the ways we conceptualise human 
consciousness and agency in light of a new science of emotions (Goodenough and 
Tucker, 2010). The binary distinction between reason and emotion is rejected on the 
grounds that it commits us to an overly simplified understanding of our capacity to 
reflect upon and assign value to our life experience. New developments in 
neuroscience have revealed ever more extensive and elaborate interactions between 
parts of our brain that process emotion and areas involved in rational decision-making 
(Damasio, 2000; 2008; Decety, 2011; LeDoux, 1998; Panksepp, 1998; Singer and 
Lamm, 2009).  Here, it is generally accepted that human cognition is always involved 
in, and attached to, embodied states of feeling. Accordingly, traditions of debate 
rooted in Stoic conceptions of the antagonistic relationship between reason and 
affect, or in a Cartesian understanding that by rigour of method it is possible for us to 
unshackle our rational propensities from the encumbrance of emotion, are judged to 
be superseded by the discoveries of brain science. 
/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚŝƐ ?ƚŚĞƚŽƉŝĐŽĨ ‘ůĂǁĂŶĚĞŵŽƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐŚĞůĚƚŽďĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ
of a movement to expose the ways in which the theory and practice of law are 
disciplined by ideologically motivated power relations. Its radicalism lies in its terms 
of moral protest and in the scale of its political ambition. Investigations into the 
involvement of emotions in areas of law, and studies of how emotional experience is 
assigned legal meaning, are understood to cast light on the ways in which the premise 
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that law should have nothing to do with emotion has operated to advance the 
interests of the most powerful and institutionally privileged members of society. Such 
research is often involved in an attempt to revise our understandings of law and its 
practice from the standpoint of women (Abrams, 2005; Baker, 2005; Moran, 2000). A 
critical feminist focus is brought to bear upon the cultural conventions through which 
women are constructed in derogatory terŵƐĂƐ ‘ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůďĞŝŶŐƐ ? ?DĂĚĞŝƌĂ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
Further attention is brought to the involvement of discourses advocating the 
separation of law from emotion in hiding discriminatory practices against women 
from public view (Abrams, 2008). These critical concerns are also heavily featured in 
subaltern accounts of western law and legal process, where cold-hearted dispassion 
ŝƐ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ĂƐ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ĚĞŶǇ ƉŽƐƚĐŽůŽŶŝĂů ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ĨŽƌ
restitution for experiences of various forms of violent exploitation and abuse (Das, 
1997). 
In this context, the suggestion that we pay particular attention to the meaning 
and experience of compassion and how this operates in legal domains is accompanied 
by some radical agendas for change. It also appears that the topic of compassion has 
a tendency to antagonise moral tensions and to court political dispute. It is where the 
topic of law and emotion attracts most controversy; and it is my contention here that 
it is by working to understand the cultural character and dimensions of such 
controversy, as well as the dynamics of the intellectual and moral disputes that this 
sets in play, that we uncover some important ground on which to make sense of the 
place of law in culture and society as well as its involvement in peŽƉůĞƐ ? ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ
socio-emotional development. 
 
III. The controversy of compassion  
In this paper some progress has already been made towards exposing the contours of 
critical debates and the types of value conflicts that animate the controversy of 
compassion.  I have noted that Martha Nussbaum dwells in considerable detail on the 
fact that compassion involves us interrogating the moral meaning of human suffering, 
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that it commits us to question who or what is to blame and who or what should be 
held responsibility for the harms done to people, and further, that it brings debate to 
the morality of the types of actions that are deemed responsible and appropriate 
ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƐĞƚĞƌŵƐ ?KŶƚŚŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ĂƐĂŶ ‘ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚĞŵŽƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶŝƐ
irrevocably attached to many conflicts of interpretation and is always tied to disputed 
points of view on its role as a guide to moral practice. 
/ƚ ŝƐ ǁŽƌƚŚ ŶŽƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ĚĞďĂƚĞ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŝĞůĚ ŽĨ  ‘ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ
ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶ ?ŚĂƐĞŵĞƌŐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨŚĞĂƚĞĚƉƵďůŝc altercations over the ideological 
appropriations of emotional language and emotive gestures. In a useful review of 
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ǁŚĂƚ ƐŚĞ ĐĂůůƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ůŝďĞƌĂů ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞŽĨ ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ
connections to legal scholarship, Kathleen Woodward argues that the critical and 
political ambitions of scholars such as Martha Nussbaum (1996b; 2001) and Lynne 
Henderson (1987) have been compromised by the fact that they have published their 
ǁŽƌŬĂƚĂƚŝŵĞǁŚĞƌĞ ‘ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĂƚĞĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝƐŵ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂĚŽƉƚĞĚĂƐĂƉŽlitical 
slogan for advocates of neo-liberal social policies (Woodward, 2002). She contends 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ?ĂƐĂŶĂĚũĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĂƌŝŐŚƚ-wing 
ideological stance has had the effect of tarnishing liberal narratives with semantic and 
evaluative associations that corrupt their message and obscure their intent.  
dŚŝƐŝƐǀŝǀŝĚůǇŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚŝŶDŝĐŬĞǇ<ĂƵƐ ?ƐĂŶŐƌǇĚĞŶƵŶĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĂƐ
Ă ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ŝŶŚŝƐNew York Times article of 25th June 1999, where he contends 
that, in both conservative and liberal traditions, compassion operates to obstruct 
social justice and to deny people their human dignity. Kraus identifies it with an 
 ‘ŝŶĞŐĂůŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵ ?ƚŚĂƚĐĂƌƌŝĞƐ ‘the condescending implication of charity, of inferiority 
ĂŶĚŚĞůƉůĞƐƐŶĞƐƐŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚŽƐĞŽŶŝƚƐƌĞĐĞŝǀŝŶŐĞŶĚ ? ?<ĂƵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? He further 
ĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƵƐĞĚ ‘ƚŽŽǀĞƌƌŝĚĞƚŚĞƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?ĂŶĚƐĞŶƐŝďůĞ ?ŵŽƌĂůĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚ
ƐŚŽƵůĚŐŽǀĞƌŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚďǇĐĂƌĞĨƵůůǇĐŽŶƐidered utilitarian 
ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐǁĂŶƚƐĂŶĚŶĞĞĚƐ ?ŝďŝĚ.).  Similar views, moreover, are also 
featured in many newspaper cartoons that satirise compassion as a rhetorical weapon 
in a political chimera that favours an ideology of selfish individualism while promoting 
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distinctions between the deserving and undeserving poor, and advancing the view 
that austerity operates for the collective good of society (Woodward, 2002, p. 224). 
Woodward further takes this as evidence to support her argument that many 
of those associated with liberal narratives of compassion have failed to pay adequate 
heed to the wider cultural context in which they operate. Insofar as they appear to be 
insufficiently troubled by the ways in which compassion is open to corruption, she 
ůĂďĞůƐ,ĞŶĚĞƌƐŽŶĂŶĚEƵƐƐďĂƵŵĂƐ ‘ƉƌĞ-ideologiĐĂůĂŶĚŶĂŢǀĞ ? ?tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?p. 
 ? ? ? ) ?  KŶ tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?Ɛ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ? ŵŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ? ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ŽŶůǇ ĚƵĞ ƚŽ ĂŶ ĂďƐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ
political understanding, but also, to a lack of cultural awareness. She argues that 
liberal advocates of compassion have failed to comprehend that we are living in a 
ƐŽĐŝĂůƉĞƌŝŽĚƚŚĂƚ ŝƐĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚďǇĂ  ‘ŶĞǁĞĐŽŶŽŵǇŽĨƚŚĞĞŵŽƚŝŽŶƐ ?  ?tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ
2002, p. 227). Woodward further holds that this is connected to a series of radical and 




ĐŝƚĞĚ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ŽŶ  ‘WŽƐƚŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐŵ Žƌ ƚŚĞ ƵůƚƵƌĂů >ŽŐŝĐ ŽĨ >ĂƚĞ ĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐŵ ? ĂŶĚ ŚŝƐ
ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ ?ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚŽƚŚĞƌƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ƚŚŝƐŝƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚďǇ ‘ƚŚĞǁĂŶŝŶŐŽĨĂĨĨĞĐƚ ?
(Jameson, 1984, pp. 61-62).   Along with Jameson she claims that insofar as our culture 
ŝƐŶŽǁ ‘ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĂ ? ?ƚŚŝƐŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƐƚŽĐŽŶĨŝŶĞůĂƌŐĞƉĂƌƚƐŽĨŽƵƌĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂů
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚƚŽĞƉŚĞŵĞƌĂů ‘ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚŝĞƐ ?Žƌ ĨůĞĞƚŝŶŐ ‘ƐĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?tŽŽĚǁĂƌĚ ?
2002, p. 224).  On this account, it is not only the case that we are living in a time where 
public opinion falls prey to many carefully crafted plays on compassion in the political 
realm, but also where at a more general level of cultural experience, people are left 
burdened with a surplus of partial and indistinct feelings that lack narrative depth and 
contextual detail.  
Woodward, however, does not offer much by way of examples of the locations 
and circumstances in which people appear emotionally mystified or are left burdened 
by feelings of moral confusion. Neither does she venture to elaborate on the possible 
consequences of such experiences. Aside from declaring this to require us to engage 
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in ever more complex and difficult debates over the meanings and value of our moral 
feelings, she does not provide us with any considered point of view on what we should 
relate to the novelty of our socio-emotional condition and its propensities. There is 
now, however, much more to consider here as part of the effort to locate such worries 
and concerns in their cultural, social and historical context; and this also opens the 
door to alternative approaches to understanding the controversy of compassion. 
 
3.1 Mediatised Experience 
^ŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ :ĂŵĞƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ĐĞůĞďƌĂƚĞĚ ƉĂƉĞƌ ?ƌesearchers have devised far 
more extensive accounts of the possible impacts of mass media on our emotional 
propensities and experience of the world; and here they have been particularly 
attentive to the dynamics of compassion.  Many have concerned themselves with the 
ĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŵŽĚĞƌŶĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŵĞĚŝĂ ‘ĚŝƐƚĂŶƚƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ?ŝƐŵĂĚĞĂƌŽƵƚŝŶĞ
and familiar part of our cultural experience of the world (Boltanski, 1999; Cohen 2001; 
Linklater, 2007). Opinion, however, is deeply divided on what this signifies and on the 
possible consequences it holds for our moral thoughts, feelings and actions.  
Some are particularly impressed by the potential for mediatised knowledge 
ĂŶĚ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ĚŝƐƚĂŶƚ ƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ? ƚŽ ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ŝŶ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
humanitarianism. On this account, we should be particularly attentive to the ways in 
which the growth and spread of international non-governmental humanitarian 
organisations is connected to the development of new social arrangements and 
technologies that channel public sentiments of compassion towards responsive 
engagements with human problems on a grand scale (Höijer, 2004; Tester, 2001; 
Wilkinson, 2005). Here the numbers of people donating to events such as Live Aid, the 
scale of the charitable response to the 2004 South Asian Tsunami, and the mass 
support for the relief operations in Haiti following the devastating earthquake of 2010, 
are understood to bear testimony to the institutional realisation of a new 
 ‘ĐŽƐŵŽƉŽůŝƚĂŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĞĚďǇŐůŽďĂůŝƐĞĚcompassionate sentiment 
(Beck, 2006; Nash, 2003; Eckersley, 2007). Indeed, some go so far as to suggest that 
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ƐƵĐŚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐŚĞƌĂůĚƚŚĞĂĚǀĞŶƚŽĨĂŶĞǁ ‘ĞŵƉĂƚŚŝĐŝǀŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƉĞŽƉůĞ
are not only involved in a new global consciousness of human suffering, but are also 
equipped with unprecedented technological and social opportunities to express the 
compassion they feel for the plight of others in caring action (Nash, 2008; Rifkin, 
2009).  
By contrast, others are inclined to place a greater accent on the potential for 
such developments to hold negative consequences for our capacities for moral 
recognition and common understandings of appropriate ways to respond to the 
suffering of others. It is argued that the ubiquity of the imagery of suffering, and the 
fact that more often than not it is carefully contrived to elicit shock and upset, is 
implicated in cultural practices in which populations display ever more elevated 
 ‘ƐƚĂƚĞƐŽĨĚĞŶŝĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĨĂƚŝŐƵĞ ? ?ŽŚĞŶ ? ? ? ?  ?DŽĞůůĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ, 
insofar as people are still morally disturbed by on-screen scenes of tragedy and 
disaster, some suggest that the involvement of emoting celebrities in the promotion 
of humanitarian concerns encourages them to relate to the symbolic portrayal of 
human affliction more in terms of their feelings for the celebrity than with concern for 
the plight of people in real suffering.  For example, Lilie Chouliaraki argues that this 
has very little connection to the virtuous forms of compassionate thought and 
behaviour celebrated by Nussbaum, and ŝŶĂƌĞĨŝŶĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ:ĂŵĞƐŽŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŚĞ
ĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚŝƚƚĞŶĚƐƚŽŐŝǀĞƌŝƐĞƚŽ ‘ůŽǁ-intensity, fleeting sensibilities of a feel-good 
ĂůƚƌƵŝƐŵ ? ƚŚĂƚ ? ŝĨ ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ? ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ŵŽƌĞ ŝŶ  ‘ŝƌŽŶŝĐƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƚǇ ? ǁŝƚŚ ĚŝƐƚĂŶƚ ƐƵĨĨĞƌĞƌƐ
thaŶĨƌŽŵĂŶŝŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĞĚĂŶĚĐƌĞĚŝďůǇŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚ ‘ƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƚǇŽĨƉŝƚǇ ? ?ŚŽƵůŝĂƌĂŬŝ ? ? ? ? ? ?
pp. 172 W205).  This worry about the types of thoughts, feelings and actions that people 
are involved in when graphic scenes of human suffering are routinely broadcast to 
them via television and the internet further moves Luc Boltanski to suggest that, more 
ŽĨƚĞŶ ƚŚĂŶ ŶŽƚ ? ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ďĞŝŶŐ Ă  ‘ĚĞƚĂĐŚĞĚ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌ ? ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶ ĂĨĨůŝĐƚŝŽŶ
makes people feel politically powerless and morally inadequate (Boltanski, 1999). 
Insofar as such scenes are encountered in social locations such as homes and in work 
offices where individuals are denied the means to adequately respond to the 
imperative of action that the brute facts of suffering impresses upon them, he argues 
that they are set to frustrate and deny compassionate actions. Similarly, when 
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ƐƚƵĚǇŝŶŐŶĞǁĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?ƐŽŵĞĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐŝƐƚƐĐŽŶƚĞŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
mass dissemination of the imagery of suffering via commercial forms of cultural 
reproduction and exchange ŝƐŶŽǁĞĨĨĞĐƚŝŶŐĂŵĂũŽƌƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŵŽƌĂů
outlooks and moral connections to others, and  ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐŝƚ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂůŝƐĞƐ ?Ă
ǀŝǀŝĚ ĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐ ŽĨ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ŝŶ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƐ ƚŚĂƚĨŽƌĞĐůŽƐĞ ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ĨŽƌ
effective participation in public debate and withhold the option of a compassionate 
engagement with human needs (Biehl, et al., 2007).  
Such criticisms incorporate the tacit assumption that, under normal 
circumstances, individuals should be able to engage with a proportionate response to 
human suffering, or at the very least, that it should be possible to apply the moral 
feelings they experience in response to their witness of suffering to practical actions 
ƚŚĂƚĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĐĂƌĞ ?/ƚŝƐŶŽƚ ŶůǇĂƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚůoss or absence of 
rational understanding that is mourned here, but also, the lack of a means to engage 
with a morally adequate and practically effective response to calamitous situations.  It 
is important to pay heed to the fact that writers such Boltanski and Chouliaraki 
operate from a critical position that appeals to the desire for our experience of the 
world to make rational moral sense and for our actions to hold rationally adequate 
moral meaning.  By attending to such matters, moreover, we also might better 
appreciate the extent to which critical worries connected to our subjection to fleeting 
ĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƐǁŝƚŚ ‘ĚŝƐƚĂŶƚƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ?ĂƌĞĨƵĞůůĞĚďǇƋƵŝƚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚmodalities of modern 
experience, and especially those where the causes of human suffering are more 
readily understandable and can be addressed as problems over which we can exercise 
some form of rational control.  
 
3.2 Ever intensifying forces of rationalisation  
/Ĩ ǁĞ ƚĂŬĞ ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ EƵƐƐďĂƵŵ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ĐŽŵŵŝƚƐ ƵƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
attempt to make moral sense of human suffering, then we might well be concerned 
to examine the forms of culture that are commonly used for this purpose. This opens 
the door to a considerable range of theoretical and historical perspectives on our 
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cultural proclivities, terms of moral experience and modes of reasoning, and if taken 
seriously, many of these hold far-reaching consequences for how we might venture to 
understand the dynamics set within our social character and condition (Amato, 1990; 
Barrington Moore Jr., 1972; Pickering and Rosati, 2013; Wilkinson and Kleinman, 
2016). 
As far as sociological theory is concerned, Max Weber offers one of the most 
carefully developed accounts of how modern people are culturally disposed to 
ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞǁŝƚŚĂŶĚƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ? ?tŝůŬŝŶƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?,ĞƌĞ ?Ă
focus is brought to the ways in which individuals respond to suffering with quests for 
rational understanding and with the imperative to apply this to combating the 
deleterious effects of suffering on human life. Weber analyses the conflicts of value 
and meaning that are exacerbated in these contexts and seeks to make clear their 
consequences for social action. Moreover, he also attends to many unintended 
ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚůǇĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚs to invest their experience 
of the world with moral meaning and to make their lives conform to desired value 
objectives.    
At the same time as this approach is used by Weber to explore the propensity 
for Protestant traditions of theodicy to advance processes of secularization, it also 
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐƚŽĂ ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐǇ ?ƚŚĂƚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƚŽƌƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŽĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ
his standpoint on our existential situation under conditions of modernity (Tenbruck, 
1980; Turner, 1992). Notably, Weber holds that the rationalizing of thought and action 
ƚŚĂƚĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞƐƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞƐƚŽŵĂŬĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨĂŶĚƚŽĂůůĞǀŝĂƚĞƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐŚĂƐƚŚĞ
unintended consequence of making them still more vulnerable to experience suffering 
as a morally outrageous and intellectually unacceptable problem in their lives. He 
argues that the potential for the problem of suffering to shatter and shock our 
normative expectations for reality grows with the advance and force of modern 
rationalization. As Talcott Parsons notes: 
 ‘tĞďĞƌ Q ?ŚŽůĚƐƚŚĂƚ ?ƚŚĞŵŽƌĞŚŝŐŚůǇƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĞĚĂŶŽƌĚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚŚĞ
tension, the greater the exposure of major elements of a population to 
experiences which are frustrating in the very specific sense, not merely that 
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things happen that contravene tŚĞŝƌ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝŶŐƐŚĂƉƉĞŶǁŚŝĐŚ
ĂƌĞ ‘ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐůĞƐƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŽƵŐŚƚŶŽƚƚŽŚĂƉƉĞŶ ?,ĞƌĞĂďŽǀĞĂůů
lie the problems of suffering and evil . . . ? (Parsons, 1966, p. xlvii) 
Here it seems that Weber is particularly concerned with the fact that the more that 
modern societies succeed in making human health and public safety conform to 
measures of rational control (for example, through advances in modern medical 
science, the development of ever more technologically efficient means to minimise 
our exposure to risks on public transport, and the development of the legislative 
ŵĞĂŶƐ ƚŽ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ) ? ƚŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĞǇ ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ
expectations for reality in which human suffering is set to be encountered as a moral 
outrage. Inevitably, there will be times where rational systems of control are no longer 
ĂďůĞ ƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƵƐ ĨƌŽŵǁŚĂƚtĞďĞƌĐĂůůƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĨŽƌĐĞ ŽĨ ůŝĨĞ ? ? ĂŶĚŽŶƐƵĐŚ
occasions, he suggests that modern people are set to discover themselves woefully ill-
equipped to make adequate moral sense of their experience of the world (Weber, 
1948). 
Some similar views, although set in a far less sophisticated frame of analysis, 
ĂƌĞ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚ ŝŶ /ǀĂŶ /ůůŝĐŚ ?Ɛ ĨĂŵŽƵƐ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝĂƚƌŽŐĞŶŝĐ ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ŵŽĚĞƌŶ
medicine ǁŚĞƌĞŚĞĂƌŐƵĞƐ P ‘ ?ď ?y transforming pain, illness, and death from a personal 
challenge into a technical problem, medical practice expropriates the potential of 
people to deal with their human condition in an autonomous way and becomes the 
source of a new kind of un-ŚĞĂůƚŚ ? ?/ůůŝĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ǇŶŽŵĞĂŶƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĚŽĞƐtĞďĞƌ
ƐŚĂƌĞ ŝŶ /ůůŝĐŚ ?Ɛ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĞ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ƌĞŶŽƵŶĐĞŵŽĚĞƌŶ ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ƐŽ ĂƐ ƚŽ
ƌĞĐŽǀĞƌƐŽŵĞ ‘ƉƌĞ-ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ?ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽĨĐŽƉŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ
of personal resilience. Arguably the compassion he feels for our inherent frailties and 
vulnerabilities leaves him still cautiously celebrating any means by which there may 
be some temporary reprieve from suffering, for ultimately, he holds that one way or 
another we shall inevitaďůǇďĞŵĂĚĞƚŽĞŶĚƵƌĞŵĂŶǇƉĂŝŶĨƵů ‘ĂŶƚŝŶŽŵŝĞƐŽĨĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?




3.3 ŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨŽƵƌ ?ĐŝǀŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? 
The bearing of processes of rationalisation upon our emotional outlooks and 
behaviours is further developed as a core concern in the social theory of Norbert Elias. 
/ŶĂƚŚĞƐŝƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚďǇtĞďĞƌ ?ƐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ ?ůŝĂƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƵƐǁŝƚŚĂǇĞƚŵŽƌĞĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞĚ
account of the ways in which our compassionate temperament is related to the 
development of instruments and techniques of rational social- and self-control. While 
charting the historical development of a social psychology in which individuals are 
disposed to repress and inhibit their violent impulses, he also aims to explain how this 
is related to the tendency for modern people to be emotionally distressed and morally 
sickened by the sight of human suffering (Elias 1994). 
In this account, the studied manners and carefully cultivated moral sensibilities 
ŽĨ  ‘ĐŝǀŝůŝƐĞĚ ? ƉĞŽƉůĞ ĂƌĞ ĂůƐŽ ŚĞůĚ ƚŽ ƉůĂǇ an important part in shaping modern 
conventions of compassion and their elevation to positions of public virtue. Moreover, 
we are encouraged to understand the compassion of modern humanitarianism not 
only at face value as being motivated by a concern to dĞůŝǀĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞĨƌŽŵŚĂƌŵ ?ƐǁĂǇ ?
but also, as an expression of a desire to discipline human thoughts and behaviours so 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŵĂĚĞŵŽƌĞĂŵĞŶĂďůĞƚŽŵŽƌĂůĂŶĚůĞŐĂůƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?,ĞƌĞůŝĂƐ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ
of our socio-emotional configuration shares in Michel FoƵĐĂƵůƚ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƚŽĞǆƉŽƐĞ
the ways in which the ethics of care expressed through modern humanitarianism 
ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞĂƐĂĨŽƌŵŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůƉŽǁĞƌŝŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐůŝǀĞƐ ?&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
/ŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐůŝĂƐ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŝƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚďǇĂ&ƌĞƵĚŝĂŶŵŽĚĞůŽĨƚŚĞŚƵŵan psyche, 
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƐƚƌĞƐƐŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨ ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƌĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶƚ
and destructive instincts and the suppression of sadistic and sadomasochistic 
tendencies. The modern compassionate temperament is understood to be motivated 
not only by care for the other, but also by many moral worries connected to our 
cultural propensity to be fascinated by sensationalised depictions of human pain. In 
this respect, Elias encourages us to pay heed to the ways in which humanitarian 
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revulsion towards human suffering draws from a cultural well that also makes it 
possible for people to gaze upon the pain of others as a prurient pleasure.  
A considerable amount of historical research is now committed to 
documenting the origins and development of modern humanitarianism and the 
cultural politics of its compassion (Berlant, 2004; Hunt, 2007; Wilson and Brown, 
2009). Here it is widely noted that the flowering of humanitarian sentiment is allied to 
 ‘ƚŚĞƉŽƌŶŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŽĨƉĂŝŶ ?ĂŶĚĂĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚo relate to visual portrayals of 
ŚƵŵĂŶ ƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ĂƐ Ă  ‘ĚĞůŝĐŝŽƵƐ ŚŽƌƌŽƌ ?  ?,ĂůƚƚƵŶĞŶ ?  ? ? ?   ZŽǌĂƌŝŽ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? dŚĞ
cultivation of compassion is tied to cultural forces that work to sensationalise pain and 
entice many people to revel in its spectacle. Indeed, there is a long tradition of 
humanitarian writing on the danger that by appropriating the imagery of suffering as 
a means to protest against the harms done to people, they also indulge a great deal 
ŽĨ ‘ƉƌŽŵŝƐĐƵŽƵƐǀŽǇĞƵƌŝƐŵ ? ?/ŐŶĂƚŝĞĨĨ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?tŚŝůĞƐŽŵĞŚŽld that it may be possible 
to craft forms of writing and terms of appeal that guard against this possibility, others 
take the view that courting such unstable emotions is a risk worth taking for the sake 
ŽĨ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶŝƐŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞǁĂǇƐǁĞƌĞůĂƚĞƚŽƚŚĞƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐof others. 
For example, in a study of the  ‘ƚĞǆƚƵĂů ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ? ĚĞǀŝƐĞĚ ďǇ ĂŶƚŝ-slavery 
campaigners such as Lydia Maria Child and Frances Harper, Carolyn Sorisio observes 
that they are heavily preoccupied with the ways in which their efforts to document 
the ĐƌƵĞůƚŝĞƐŝŶĨůŝĐƚĞĚŽŶƐůĂǀĞƐĂƌĞƐĞƚƚŽĞůŝĐŝƚ ‘ĐŚĂƌŐĞƐŽĨŝŶĚĞůŝĐĂĐǇ ? ?^ŽƌŝƐŝŽ ? ? ? ? ? ?
p. 47). Child and Harper agonise over the moral meaning of the graphic images used 
in abolitionist tracts and aim to develop ways of writing about acts of torture and 
scenes of violence that instruct publics on how they should feel in response to what is 
revealed to them in the brute facts of suffering. Accordingly, their protest against 
slavery is always accompanied by repeated warnings to readers that they should guard 
ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ ĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƐ ŽĨ ƐƉĞĐƚĂƚŽƌƐŚŝƉ ? ƚŚĂƚ ĞƌŽƚŝĐŝǌĞ ĂŶĚ
objectify slaves bodies (Sorisio, 2000, p. 49). Child and Harper are not only worried by 
the possible ways in which their involvement with the polemics of pain courts the 
ŵŽƌĂů ĐŽŶĚĞŵŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ  ‘ĚĞĐĞŶƚ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽ ǁŝƚŚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ĨŽƌ ƚŚŝƐ ƚŽ ĐŽƌƌƵƉƚ
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƐĞŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?
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  By contrast, Gregg Crane claims that Harriet Beecher Stowe resolved not to 
allow herself to be so worried by such concerns (Crane, 1996). He notes that following 
the public reaction to hŶĐůĞdŽŵ ?ƐĂďŝŶ (1852), Stowe devised Dred: A Tale of the 
Great Dismal Swamp (1856) in response to the criticisms directed towards her 
sentimental characterisation of Uncle Tom and to the emotive content of her writing.  
He claims that while her portrayal of Dred, the revolutionary leader of the slaves living 
on the swamp, is designed to acknowledge the potential for sentiments of compassion 
to operate as a succour to violence, its main purpose is to express her conviction that 
it is by force of moral feeling that alternative social worlds are rendered imaginable. 
On this view, the struggle to realise more humane forms of society is sustained more 
ďǇ ĂƉƉĞĂů ƚŽ ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŽ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ? ^ƚŽǁĞ ƚĂŬĞƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĞƌƵƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŵoral 
ƐǇŵƉĂƚŚĞƚŝĐĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ?ĞǀŽŬĞĚďǇŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĚĞƉŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĐƌƵĞůƚǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƐůĂǀĞƐĂƐĂ ‘ƐƵƌĞ
ƐŝŐŶĂů ?ƚŚĂƚĂůůŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐĂƌĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚƚŽ ‘ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? ?ƌĂŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉƉ ?
177- ? ? ? ) ?^ŚĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĐĞůĞďƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌĂ ‘ŵŽƌĂů-emotional dissŽŶĂŶĐĞ ?ƚŽ
move people to take actions to oppose the apologists for slavery and end its practice. 
For Stowe the greater danger lies in the propensity for the rational culture that 
presides over systems of law and government to obstruct the humanitarian 
questioning of established convention.   
 
IV. For discussion 
The controversy of compassion is animated by some fundamental standpoints on our 
modern condition. It commits us to morally evaluate our social history and its 
presiding forms of cultural experience. It invites us to investigate the cultural 
character of our rationality and to attend to its human consequences. It further 
involves us in the attempt to make ourselves consciously alert to the dynamics set 
within our socio-emotional constitution and to how these inform our political 
attitudes and moral conduct. 
Insofar as compassion bears testimony to how we understand and respond to 
the problem of suffering, then our assessment of its meaning and function is made a 
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high-stakes activity. It draws a focus to how we morally relate to people in many 
desperate and harmful situations. It exposes our moral character and holds it up for 
public debate. Moreover, the fact that it concerns how we are moved to care for 
people in contexts where life matters a great deal is bound to provoke moral disquiet, 
for here ĚŽŝŶŐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŚŝŶŐ ? ŚŽůĚƐ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ŚƵŵĂŶ ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ?  /ŶĚĞĞĚ ? ĂƐ
Adam Smith famously observed, our moral sentiments of compassion contain not only 
the worry that we care in an appropriate and responsible way for the suffering of 
others, but also, worries about how we will be seen to be doing this and how this 
makes us subject to the moral judgments of others (Smith, 2006 [1790]). 
For these reasons the controversy about compassion might well be identified 
as a constant companion to law, or perhaps it is more accurate to portray this 
relationship as one in which law, and especially law under conditions of modernity, is 
fatefully set in a position where it is made to negotiate with the social meaning and 
morality of compassion. In light of the sociological insights into compassion featured 
in this paper, moreover, those involved in the practice of law should be particularly 
concerned to attend to the unintended consequences of their work and the fact they 
are dealing with many areas of controversy for which there can be no satisfactory legal 
resolutions. 
In one of the most famous critical commentaries on compassion in public life, 
the political theorist, Hannah Arendt, argues that we should be particularly wary of 
ƚŚĞ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ĨŽƌ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ? ƚŽ ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ ƌĂƐŚ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ
thoughtless actions (Arendt, 1963, pp. 70-90).  She portrays compassion as a 
 ‘ďŽƵŶĚůĞƐƐĞŵŽƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵƐƉĞŽƉůĞǁŝƚŚƚhe desire to vanquish suffering.  
When possessed by such conviction of feeling, Arendt contends that they will have no 
regard for the wider consequences of their actions. She argues that compassion 
compels action and leaves no room for debate.  
ƐǁŝƚŚŵƵĐŚŽĨƌĞŶĚƚ ?ƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ?ŚĞƌĞƐƐĂǇ ‘ŽŶƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
tendency for this to operate as an incitement to compassion has attracted a 
considerable amount of debate (Bernstein, 1986; Canovan, 1994; Fraser, 1990; 
Frankenberg, 1995; Wolin, 1983). There is no agreement as to how we should 
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interpret her critical intentions or evaluate their consequences.  One view holds that 
ƐŚĞŝŶƚĞŶĚƐŚĞƌƌĞĂĚĞƌƐƚŽ ‘ĞŶĚƵƉǁŝƚŚƐŽŵĞƐŽƌƚŽĨĂƉŽƌŝĂŝŶƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽŚĞƌƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĨŽƌƐŚĞŚŽůĚƐƚŚŝƐƚŽďĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŽŶŚŽǁƚŽƌĞlate 
to our human condition and the value of our humanity (Hyvönen, 2014, p. 570).  
Accordingly, Arendt writes not so much with a mind to declare a firm standpoint or to 
persuade us to adopt a conclusive point of view, but rather, to initiate trains of 
thought that are set to involve us in the perplexities of her thinking and its political 
dilemmas.  ƌĞŶĚƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŝƐĂŵŽƌĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽĚƌĂǁƵƐŝŶƚŽ
the agony of politics. The contradictions of her political thought are there by design 
(Canovan, 1978). 
At the same time as Arendt contends that compassion is opposed to debate, 
she aims to make it debatable. It can be argued that she was all too aware of the fact 
that it is an inevitable accompaniment to our social questions and moral worries 
surrounding the assignment of value to human-social life; and further, that she knew 
that compassion can never be expelled from arenas of public debate. On this view, 
she aims to involve us in dwelling on its controversy and to persuade us to take it 
seriously for the pursuit of human understanding.  
I contend that this is what we should do here. The controversy of compassion 
matters insofar as it serves to worry us over the values and standards by which we 
relate to othĞƌƐ ?/ƚ ŝƐ  ‘ƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůĞŵŽƚŝŽŶ ? ? but by its controversy it also operates to 
draw social life into question and provokes debate over its moral meaning and human 
purpose. While some legal scholars may respond to this with a drive to devise and 
enforce more effective measures of regulation over our compassionate temperament, 
they may well find that this does more to aggravate than to resolve many clashes of 
human value and interest.  In this light, movements to discipline compassion and 
render it rationally accountable can be an important part of the awakening to our 
inherently conflicted social condition.   
Some of the most dramatic examples of this point are found in the history of 
attempts by law courts to find an adequate means to compensate the victims of large-
ƐĐĂůĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůĂĐĐŝĚĞŶƚƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞŚŽƉĂůƚƌĂŐĞĚǇ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚanthropologist Ravindra 
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Khare refers to as an instance of  ‘ůĂďǇƌŝŶƚŚŝŶĞ ůĂǁ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƵŶĞŶĚŝŶŐ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?  ?<ŚĂƌĞ 
1990). Khare along with a number of commentators identifies the ongoing struggle to 
provide a legal redress to public demands ĨŽƌĂĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĂƚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ǀŽŝĐĞƐ
oĨǀŝĐƚŝŵƐĂŶĚƐƵƌǀŝǀŽƌƐ ?ĂƐƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐ inherently vexed state of affairs 
(Coombs 1999; Das 1997; Khare 1990:14; Sarangi 2002). My wider argument here is 
that presiding cultural conditions are set to further breed and intensify such conflicts. 
*[Affiliation, email, and acknowledgements]. 
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